Abstract So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji's new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in particular we give an example in which the effect occurs in a larger domain, according to Shogenji justification, than Carnap's measure of confirmation would have led one to expect.
Introduction
Many functions have been proposed as measures of the confirmation that an evidential proposition gives to a hypothetical proposition. They are functions of the conditional probability that the hypothesis is true, given the evidence, as well as of the unconditional probabilities accorded to the hypothesis and to the evidence. The plethora of confirmation measures is a serious impediment to progress, since the various functions are not ordinally equivalent to one another. According to one measure, hypothesis h 1 might be more highly confirmed by evidence e 1 than h 2 is confirmed by e 2 , whilst another measure might reverse the ordering. If a confirmation function is to serve as a measure of justification, it must have some special properties. In order to say that a hypothesis is justified by some evidence, it is not enough that a particular confirmation function produces a number that is positive: the number must be greater than some threshold of acceptance. Moreover, not any confirmation function is acceptable, for a minimal requirement is surely that, if two or more independent hypotheses are each confirmed to a degree more (less) than the threshold level of acceptance, then their conjunction must also be confirmed more (less) than that same threshold level. Shogenji calls this criterion of acceptability the General Conjunction Requirement (GCR), and he proposes a particular measure that satisfies it Shogenji (2009) .
In this paper I prove that, while Shogenji's new measure is by no means the only function that satisfies GCR, it is ordinally equivalent to any function that does so. We may therefore say that Shogenji's measure is, up to ordinal equivalence, the unique measure that respects the requirement. If hypothesis h 1 is more highly confirmed by evidence e 1 than h 2 is confirmed by e 2 , according to one measure that satisfies GCR, this remains true for any other measure that does so.
I consider also the problem of the irrelevant conjunction: while its Bayesian resolution is not robust with respect to all the measures of confirmation on the market, it is resolved by all measures of justification that respect GCR. I also give a new class of examples of what may be called the Conjunction Effect, in which the degree of justification of the conjunction of two hypotheses is greater than the degrees of confirmation of either of the hypotheses separately.
Confirmation and justification
A measure of the confirmation of a hypothesis, h, by some evidence, e, may in general be a function of the three double probabilities P(h ∧ e), P(h ∧ ¬e) and P(¬h ∧ e), which are independent, except that their sum cannot be greater than one. More conveniently, one replaces these variables by P(h|e) = P(h ∧ e)/P(e), P(h) and P(e),which are also independent. Such a measure is then some function F[P(h|e), P(h), P(e)]. Following Shogenji, we shall first argue that the last argument should be dropped in any measure of the justification of h by e. For if it were not so, one would be able to change the value of F simply by appending some arbitrary, probabilistically independent and irrelevant extra 'evidence' to e, say e . The new measure would have the form F[P(h|e ∧ e ), P(h), P(e ∧ e )]. Since e is assumed to be irrelevant both to the hypothesis and to the evidence, it is supposed that P(e ∧ e ) = P(e)P(e ) P(h ∧ e ∧ e ) = P(h ∧ e)P(e ), so P(h|e ∧ e ) = P(h|e). We require that the measure of justification be unaltered by the adjunction of e , so
F[P(h|e), P(h), P(e)] = F[P(h|e), P(h), P(e)P(e )].
Now since P(e ) could in principle be any number in [0, 1], F cannot depend nontrivially on the third argument. Such a measure of justification should in fact have the following three properties:
(i) It should be a function of P(h|e) and P(h) only.
(ii) At constant P(h|e), it should be a decreasing function of P(h).
(iii) At constant P(h), it should be an increasing function of P(h|e).
We write, as the general form of a measure of justification,
Many candidate measures of confirmation have been suggested in the course of the years. A popular one, due to Carnap (1962) , is
Another one, invented by Keynes (1921) , is
and it is clear that both of these satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii). Two other measures, favoured by Kemeney and Oppenheim, and by Good, respectively, are
They appear at first sight to have a different structure; but a little algebra serves to show that they too can be expressed as functions of P(h|e) and P(h) only, and also that requirements (ii) and (iii) are respected. On the other hand, the confirmation measures
depend nontrivially on P(e), as well as P(h|e) and P(h), and therefore cannot be regarded as candidate measures of justification.
Justification and the conjunction requirements
What is the 'correct' justification function, F? Evidently conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) do not determine it uniquely. Although the measures of confirmation C, S and N are ruled out of court by (i), D, R, K and L survive as possibilities, and more can be conjured up. The worry is not merely that D, R, K and L are different measures, but rather that they are ordinally inequivalent. To illustrate this, consider the set of examples
Using subscripts to indicate the values of m and n, we find
Evidently Keynes (R), Kemeny and Oppenheim (K ) and Good (L) agree about the relative ordering of the degrees of confirmation that e accords to h in these examples, but they disagree with Carnap (D). But should we have more confidence in Keynes' ordering than in Carnap's on the basis of a majority vote? Evidently we need some other criterion to pick out a unique ordering. According to Shogenji (2009) , one should add to (i), (ii) and (iii) an additional requirement of the following kind:
(iv) Suppose that h 1 and h 2 are two hypotheses, unconditionally independent and also independent conditionally on evidence e. If both h 1 and h 2 have measures of justification greater (less) than t, then the conjunction of these independent hypotheses must also have a measure of justification greater (less) than t.
Symbolically, if
then it is required that
Shogenji calls this the General Conjunction Requirement (GCR). Moreover, GCR is required to hold, not merely for two independent hypotheses, but for any finite number of them. It should be noted that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) require that a measure of justification does not to depend on t, the choice made for the threshold of acceptance, but only on the conditional and unconditional probabilities assigned to the hypothesis, in light of the evidence. All the popular measures of confirmation fail to meet the General Conjunction Requirement [for a discussion of the nine measures of confirmation that we specified in the previous section, see Atkinson et al. (2009)] .
Condition (iv) implies (iv ) If both h 1 and h 2 have measures of justification equal to t, the conjunction of these independent hypotheses must also have a measure of justification equal to t. 
Shogenji calls this the Special Conjunction Requirement (SCR). Thus GCR entails SCR.
In the Appendix we show that the most general measure of justification that satisfies SCR, and the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), can be written in the form
where f [x] is a continuous, monotonically decreasing function of x. Moreover, we show that such a measure satisfies GCR too, so it is in fact the most general form that is allowed by the General Conjunction Requirement. It is also shown in the Appendix that all such measures are ordinally equivalent to one another. The simplest example is
The latter is identical to the function that Shogenji proposes, namely
Note that the value of this expression does not change if one replaces the base 2 by any other positive number. Another possibility is
Of course, J and J are ordinally equivalent to one another, the first having the infinite range (−∞, 1], the second having the finite range [−1, 1]. The measure J can also be rewritten in the form
where the exponent is defined by
Note that γ is positive. Although justification measures are far from unique-the general form involves after all an arbitrary monotonic function-the ordering that they all induce is unique, and this is usually the important consideration. Returning to the examples (3), we find the ordering
It is interesting that the Shogenji ordering of these examples differs from those given by Carnap, by Keynes, by Good, or by Kemeny and Oppenheim.
Irrelevant conjunction
According to the hypothetico-deductive method, evidence e is deemed to confirm hypothesis h relative to some background b when h∧b logically entails e, i.e. e∧h∧b = h ∧ b. However, it follows ineluctably that, for any other hypothesis h whatsoever,
This means that e also confirms the conjunction of h and h, relative to the same background b, even if h is independent of e, h and e ∧ h. This is so counter-intuitive, nay so unacceptable, that this fact has seemed to many to sound the death knell for the hypothetico-deductive method itself.
Bayesians distance themselves from this unpleasantness as follows. Hawthorne and Fitelson (2004) 
have shown that, if h is irrelevant in the sense that the likelihood of e is not affected by the conjunction of h with h and b, so P(e|h ∧ h ∧ b) = P(e|h ∧ b), then the Carnap confirmation that e accords to h, in the presence of b, is greater than that accorded to the conjunction of h and h. This follows because the condition of irrelevance means that

P(e ∧ h ∧ h ) = P(h ∧ h )P(h ∧ e)/P(h),
where for brevity we have suppressed explicit mention of the background b. Consider in this and subsequent formulae that the probability space has been reduced in such a way that P(b) = 1. Then
It follows that, if h is Carnap-confirmed by e, then 0 ≤ D(h ∧ h , e) ≤ D(h, e).
The conjunction of h and h is also Carnap-confirmed by e, but generally to a lesser degree [unless P(h ∧ h ) = P(h), which is so only if h logically entails h (in the presence of b)].
This result is satisfactory, for an irrelevant h that has little overlap with h will produce a conjunction that is Carnap-confirmed only to a slight extent. But there is a snake in the grass. This result does not hold for all measures of confirmation. It does work with Good's measure L, and with Kemeny and Oppenheim's measure K , but not with Keynes' measure R. In fact
So with Keynes' measure the irrelevant conjunction problem is back in full force: the conjunction of a hypothesis with an irrelevant hypothesis (remember, always relative to some background) is Keynes-confirmed to precisely the same degree as is the original hypothesis alone. So Hawthorne and Fitelson's result is not robust, in the sense that it fails for one commonly used measure of confirmation (as these authors realized full well). But Shogenji has now shown us that a solution is at hand! We should not be using measures of confirmation, but rather measures of justification. In fact the measure (4) of justification can be written
and therefore
Because all measures of justification are ordinally equivalent, this resolution of the irrelevant conjunction problem applies to them all.
Conjunction effects
In this section we shall be looking for situations in which two hypotheses h 1 and h 2 are both confirmed by some evidence e, and in which the conjunction h 1 ∧ h 2 is even more highly confirmed. From the Venn diagram of Fig. 1 we read off
Fig. 1 Venn diagram for hypotheses and evidence
We consider first the Carnap measure of confirmation,
before returning to Shogenji's measure of justification. The strategy will be to reduce the effective number of dimensions from seven to two. Consider the case in which six of the triple probabilities are equal, x = y 0 = y 1 = y 2 = z 1 = z 2 , but where the seventh, z 0 , has in general a different value. The global constraint is that the sum of all seven triples cannot exceed unity. We find
The following domains can thus be distinguished:
What happens if we use Shogenji's new measure of justification instead of Carnap's measure of confirmation? The first three inequalities of (5) are unaffected. This is clear, for D(h 1 , e) > 0 is equivalent to P(h 1 |e) > P(h 1 ), and that is equivalent to J (h 1 , e) > 0, and similarly
The matter is different for the last inequality of (5). When are the hypotheses h 1 or h 2 less justified by e than their conjunction is justified by e? From the definition (4) we calculate
So there is a conjunction effect, namely The black triangle within the above triangular region indicates where there is a conjunction effect (according to both D and J ), and where moreover h 1 and h 2 are disconfirmed by e, while h 1 ∧ h 2 is confirmed. The conjunction is not merely confirmed, but is in fact justified by e, while the conjuncts are each unjustified. This yields a new example of what was called the Alan Author effect in Atkinson et al. (2009) .
In the paper just cited, it was proved that the conjunction effect occurs whenever z 1 = 0 = z 2 , irrespective of the values of the remaining five triple probabilities. This was demonstrated in that paper to be true for ten different interpretations of what confirmation means. The result was on that account called robust. With the new measure of justification, we may ask whether J (h 1 ∧ h 2 , e) > J (h 1 , e) whenever z 1 = 0 = z 2 . We find
, and this is strictly positive if none of the remaining five triples vanish, since the two factors in the numerator are positive, while the two factors in the denominator are negative. Similarly J (h 1 ∧ h 2 , e) > J (h 2 , e). Thus z 1 = 0 = z 2 is a sufficient condition for a justificatory conjunction effect.
For any x ∈ (0, 1), we can iterate this equation to obtain
Since the function G(x, u) is required to be continuous at x = 0, we can take the limit n → ∞ and conclude that G(
is an arbitrary continuous function of u. Hence J (h, e) = f log P(h|e) log P(h) .
J (h, e) is an increasing function of P(h|e) and a decreasing function of P(h), so it follows that f [u] must be a decreasing function of u (since log P(h|e) and log P(h) are both negative). The most general function of justification that satisfies SCR has the form (8), subject to the constraint that f [u] is a continuous, monotonically decreasing function of u. We shall show that the general form (8) respects GCR as well as SCR. Let h 1 and h 2 be independent of one another, conditionally with respect to e, and also unconditionally. Suppose that a realization, J , of Eq. 8 is such that J (h 1 , e) > t and J (h 2 , e) > t, where t is some threshold of acceptance. So log P(h 1 |e) log P(h 1 ) < f −1 (t) and log P(h 2 |e) log P(h 2 ) < f −1 (t) ,
where the inverse function, f −1 , is guaranteed to exist, given the monotonicity of f . Then log[P(h 1 ∧ h 2 |e)] = log[P(h 1 |e)P(h 2 |e)] = log P(h 1 |e) + log P(h 2 |e) > f −1 (t)[log P(h 1 ) + log P(h 2 )]
Therefore log P(h 1 ∧ h 2 |e) log P(h 1 ∧ h 2 ) < f −1 (t) , and so J (h 1 ∧ h 2 , e) > t. A similar proof works with the inequalities working in the opposite direction, i.e. if J (h 1 , e) < t and J (h 2 , e) < t then J (h 1 ∧ h 2 , e) < t. Moreover, the method extends straightforwardly to an arbitrary finite number of independent hypotheses h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h n , instead of two. This concludes the demonstration that Eq. 8 encapsulates the most general measure of justification.
